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Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion : evidence from German treasury auctions

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Author Info
Rocholl, Jörg
Abstract

This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between 1998 and 2002. It documents the seller?s use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially. It does not maximize revenues in a single-period game, but moves up in the competitive demand curve to set the auction price close to the market price. Bidders do not make profits in German auctions on average, while their bidding strategies reflect the uncertainty created by the seller?s discretion. The paper extends and tests the multi-unit auction model by Lengwiler (1999). The empirical evidence is consistent with the implication that the market-clearing price depends on the seller?s marginal cost rather than on the submitted demand. --

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Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies with number 2005,15.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:3374

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Related research
Keywords: Discriminatory auctions; Winner?s curse; Seller discretion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 4-15. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hoidal Bjonnes, Geir, 2001. "Winner's Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from the Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions," SIFR Research Report Series 3, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist & Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2002. "Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 394-424, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2003. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions," Working Papers 2003.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Huang, Chi-fu, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-34, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Goldreich, David, 2003. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Yvan Lengwiler, 1998. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-28, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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