THE EFFECT OF AUCTION FORMAT ON EFFICIENCY AND REVENUE IN DIVISIBLE GOODS AUCTIONS: A TEST USING KOREAN TREASURY AUCTIONS -super-*
AbstractThis paper measures the efficiency and revenue properties of the two most popular formats for divisible goods auctions: the uniform-price and discriminatory auction. We analyze bids into the Korean Treasury auctions which have used both formats. We find that the discriminatory auction yields statistically higher revenue. Unlike previous work that uses data from only one format, we are able to compare the efficiency properties of the two formats. We find that the discriminatory auction better allocates treasury bills to the highest value financial institutions. However, the differences in revenue and efficiency are not large because the auctions are very competitive. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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- Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2009. "Quantifying the cost of excess market thickness in timber sale auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 553-566, September.
- Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders’ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 760, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders’ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 010501, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
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