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Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric

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Olivier Armantier and Erwann Sbai ()
Abstract

The structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetry across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries between bidders. A counter-factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auction's participants.

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Paper provided by SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 03-02.

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  1. Saikat Nandi, 1997. "Treasury auctions: what do the recent models and results tell us?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 4-15. [Downloadable!]
  2. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
  3. McFadden, Daniel, 1989. "A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 995-1026, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, . "Nash Equilibrium Approximations in Games of Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 99-01, SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1992. "Coordination in Split Award Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 681-707, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Armantier, O. & Florens, J.-P. & Richard, J.-F., 1997. "Equilibre approximatif et regle intuitive: une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale," Papers 97.487, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  8. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & OSSARD, Hervé & VUONG, Quang, 1991. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 7, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  9. Tenorio, Rafael, 1993. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 302-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Newey, Whitney K & West, Kenneth D, 1987. "Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of Moments Estimation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 777-87, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2002. "Identification of Standard Auction Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2107-2140, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Loretta J. Mester, 1995. "There's more than one way to sell a security: the Treasury's auction experiment," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Jul, pages 3-17.
  13. Umlauf, Steven R., 1993. "An empirical study of the Mexican Treasury bill auction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 313-340, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Huang, Chi-fu, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-34, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  17. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F., 2001. "Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 29-34, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. repec:att:wimass:1920013 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  22. Pakes, Ariel & Pollard, David, 1989. "Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1027-57, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Eklöf, Matias, 2003. "Assessing Social Costs of Inefficient Procurement Design," Working Paper Series 2003:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  24. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, 1993. " Treasury Auction Bids and the Salomon Squeeze," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1403-19, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Singleton, Kenneth J., 1985. "Testing specifications of economic agents' intertemporal optimum problems in the presence of alternative models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 391-413. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Donald, Stephen G & Paarsch, Harry J, 1993. "Piecewise Pseudo-maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 121-48, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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