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Information in Mechanism Design

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Abstract

We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15a/d1532.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1532.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Blundell, Newey and Persson, eds., Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 2006, pp. 186-221
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1532

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

Related research

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Information Acquisition; Ex Post Equilibrium; Robust Mechanism Design; Interdependent Values; Information Management;

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Cited by:
  1. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2005. "Optimal Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 1421, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, March.
  5. Miettinen, Paavo, 2012. "Information acquisition during a Dutch auction," Research Discussion Papers 8/2012, Bank of Finland.
  6. Jingfeng Lu, 2009. "Why a Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 181-198, February.
  7. Sophie Bade, 2010. "Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_46, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  8. Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Selling Service Plans to Differentially Informed Customers," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-125, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  10. Szech, Nora, 2011. "Optimal advertising of auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2596-2607.
  11. Peitz, Martin & Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Informing Consumers about their own Preferences," Working Papers 12-07, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  12. Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2010. "An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly," MPRA Paper 29123, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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