This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Stegeman, Mark
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45NJKYF-28/2/1cb9f1182f1417fc3c31c03c52c0f28b
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 71 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 228-259
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:71:y:1996:i:1:p:228-259

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose S. Penalva-Zuasti, 2005. "On Information Revelation in Private Value Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000520, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons," MPRA Paper 935, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs," MPRA Paper 934, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Micro Theory Working Papers tan-04-01-24-10-08-06, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Yilankaya, Okan & Celik, Gorkem, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2007. "Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition," Staff General Research Papers 12709, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  9. Antonio Miralles, 2005. "Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition," Working Papers in Economics 132, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1248, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-307, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. CRÉMER, Jacques & SPIEGEL, Yossi & ZHENG, Charles, 2003. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition," IDEI Working Papers 205, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Charity Auctions: A Field Experimental Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 1330, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 900 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.