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A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

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Yilankaya, Okan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 87 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 267-271
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:87:y:1999:i:1:p:267-271

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  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000222, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Ratifiability of Efficient Collusive Mechanisms in Second-Price Auctions with Participation Costs," Micro Theory Working Papers tan-04-04-30-01-35-41, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stephan Lauermann, 2008. "Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2005. "First-mover disadvantage," Discussion Papers 127, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rolf Tisljar, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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