Position Auctions with Consumer Search
AbstractThis paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001633.
Date of creation: 31 Oct 2007
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Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-10 (All new papers)
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