AbstractThis paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller oneÃ¢â¬â¢s patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin. "
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 506439000000000092.
Date of creation: 09 Dec 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043414, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001.
European Economic Review,
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- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing Cybermediaries," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-47, February.
- Tymon Tatur, 2000. "Asymptotically Optimal Market Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1315, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jan 2001.
- Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995.
"Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices,"
peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Competing markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 277-310, February.
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