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Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search

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Author Info
Pollock, Rufus

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Abstract

Internet search (or perhaps more accurately `web-search') has grown exponentially over the last decade at an even more rapid rate than the Internet itself. Starting from nothing in the 1990s, today search is a multi-billion dollar business. Search engine providers such as Google and Yahoo! have become household names, and the use of a search engine, like use of the Web, is now a part of everyday life. The rapid growth of online search and its growing centrality to the ecology of the Internet raise a variety of questions for economists to answer. Why is the search engine market so concentrated and will it evolve towards monopoly? What are the implications of this concentration for different `participants' (consumers, search engines, advertisers)? Does the fact that search engines act as `information gatekeepers', determining, in effect, what can be found on the web, mean that search deserves particularly close attention from policy-makers? This paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine many of these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concentration are likely to continue (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive, of this outcome (c) discuss the possible regulatory interventions that policy-makers could utilize to address these.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8885.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8885

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Related research
Keywords: Search Engine Regulation Competition Antitrust Technology

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & TIROLE, Jean, 2005. "Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report," IDEI Working Papers 275, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
  2. Pollock, R., 2007. "The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0754, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison, 2007. "Position Auctions with Consumer Search," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001633, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mark Armstrong, 2005. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Industrial Organization 0505009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1983. "Natural Oligopolies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1469-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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