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Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

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Author Info
Lawrence M. Ausubel (University of Maryland,)
Peter Cramton (University of Maryland,)

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Abstract

We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them. (JEL: D44) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
Pages: 480-493
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:2-3:p:480-493

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 02collude, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 04 Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. repec:bep:eapcon:v:1:y:2002:i:1:p:1078-1078 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 493-505, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison, 2009. "Position Auctions with Consumer Search," NBER Working Papers 15253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Cramton, 2007. "Comments on the RGGI Market Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 07rggi, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Cramton, 2009. "Innovation and Market Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 09imd, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2009. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Cramton, 2008. "Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia," Papers of Peter Cramton 08gm, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peter Cramton, 2007. "Colombia’s Forward Energy Market," Papers of Peter Cramton 07fem, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter Cramton, 2005. "How Best to Auction Oil Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 06oil, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit5, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  8. Regina Betz & Stefan Seifert & Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 2009. "Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia," Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 0929, Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Peter Cramton, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit4, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ping Zhang, 2006. "A Complete Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Uniform Price IPO Auctions," Discussion Papers 2006-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June. [Downloadable!]
  12. Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal, 2006. "Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 197-249, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
  14. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2007. "An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 07oca, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
  15. Michael O. Ball & Lawrence M. Ausubel & Frank Berardino & Peter Cramton & George Donohue & Mark Hansen & Karla Hoffman, 2007. "Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport," Papers of Peter Cramton 07mbac, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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