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Spectrum Auctions

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/01hte-spectrum-auctions.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 01hte.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision: 16 Jul 2001
Publication status: Published in Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, and Ingo Vogelsang, eds., Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., Chapter 14, 605-639, 2002.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01hte

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Spectrum Auctions Multiple Item Auctions

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 647-75, October.
    Other versions:
  4. Jeffrey S. Banks & John O. Ledyard & David P. Porter, 1989. "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-25, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
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  7. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Vijay Krishna & Robert Rosenthal, 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Game Theory and Information 9503004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Ballard, Charles L & Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1985. "General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 128-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999. [Downloadable!]
  12. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  13. Bykowsky, Mark M & Cull, Robert J & Ledyard, John O, 2000. "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 205-28, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Chakravorti, Bhaskar, et al, 1995. "Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband PCS Spectrum," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 345-73, Summer.
  16. McMillan, John, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-62, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Rosenthal, Robert W. & Wang, Ruqu, 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 32-55, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
  19. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-75, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-36, October.
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  21. Peter Cramton, 1998. "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98eer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Hazlett, Thomas W, 1998. "Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 529-75, October.
  23. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 1999. "Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities," Working Papers 99-05, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  26. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2001. "Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 453, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Marius Schwartz, 1996. "Telecommunications Reform in the United States: Promises and Pitfalls," Industrial Organization 9607001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jinpeng Ma, 1997. "English Auctions and Walrasian Equilibria with Multiple Objects: a dynamic approach," Departmental Working Papers 199702, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Grigorieva Elena & Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Müller Rudolf & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations," Research Memoranda 017, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen, 2006. "Summary of the Workshop to Support Implementing the Minimum 25 Percent Public Benefit Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Discussion Papers dp-06-45, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  6. Börgers, Tilman & Dustmann, Christian, 2001. "Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction," CEPR Discussion Papers 3072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Patrick Bajari & Jeremy T. Fox, 2005. "Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction," NBER Working Papers 11671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Marco Pagnozzi, 2007. "Resale and Bundling in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 186, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Marius Schwartz, 1997. "Telecommunications Reform in the United States: Promises and Pitfalls," Industrial Organization 9706001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Rafael Romeu & Lawrence Ausubel, 2005. "Bidder Participation and Information in Currency Auctions," IMF Working Papers 05/157, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  11. Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc, 2006. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis," Research Memoranda 040, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  12. Matthew Shum, 1998. "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers mshum-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. César Mattos & Paulo Coutinho, 2004. "The Duopoly Policy in the Brazilian Model of Telecommunications Reform," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 58(3), April. [Downloadable!]
  14. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Economics Working Papers 01, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school). [Downloadable!]
  15. Ruqu Wang & Alan Gunderson, 1998. "Signally by Jump Bidding in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 975, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," Les Cahiers de Recherche 765, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
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