Spectrum Auction Design
AbstractSpectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a variation-the combinatorial clock auction-which has been adopted by the UK and many other countries, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction while building on its strengths. The combinatorial clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on packages of lots. Most importantly, the auction allows alternative technologies that require the spectrum to be organized in different ways to compete in a technology-neutral auction. In addition, the pricing rule and information policy are carefully tailored to mitigate gaming behavior. An activity rule based on revealed preference promotes price and assignment discovery throughout the clock stage of the auction. Truthful bidding is encouraged, which simplifies bidding and improves efficiency. Experimental tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 42 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Auctions; Spectrum auctions; Market design; Package auction; Clock auction; Combinatorial auction; D44; C78; L96;
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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