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Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

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Abstract

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 11ckrs.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision: 2012
Publication status: Published in Journal of Law and Economics, 54:4, S167-S188, 2011
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11ckrs

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

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Keywords: Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; combinatorial auction;

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References

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  1. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Survey of Auction Theory, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
    [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  2. Borenstein, Severin, 1988. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating Licenses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 357-85, May.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "What Really Matters in Auction Design, from Auctions: Theory and Practice
    [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  4. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
  5. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  6. Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, 1996. "Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition," Papers of Peter Cramton 96slr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
  7. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1997. "Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 497-527, 09.
  8. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, 2009. "A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 424-454.
  9. Rosston, Gregory L., 2003. "The long and winding road: the FCC paves the path with good intentions," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 501-515, August.
  10. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx, 2008. "The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers 08-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  11. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2003. "An economic perspective on auctions," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 269-308, 04.
  12. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
    [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  13. Kwerel, Evan R & Rosston, Gregory L, 2000. "An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 253-89, May.
  14. Bazelon, Coleman, 2009. "Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 115-127, June.
  15. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
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Cited by:
  1. Gary Madden & Erik Bohlin & Thien Tran & Aaron Morey, 2014. "Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 277-298, May.
  2. Peter Cramton, 2012. "Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy," Papers of Peter Cramton 11iat, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
  3. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.

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