Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

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Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Author Info

Lawrence M. Ausubel () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Peter Cramton

Abstract

We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 04jeea.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: 2004
Publication status: Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 480-493, April-May 2004.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04jeea

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)
NEP-COM-2004-05-16 (Industrial Competition)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 02collude, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 04 Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1210, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1), pages 1078-1078. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 493-505, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," Papers of Peter Cramton 99wpvic, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jun 1999. [Downloadable!]
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Peter Cramton, 2005. "How Best to Auction Oil Rights," Papers of Peter Cramton 06oil, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit5, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
Peter Cramton, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit4, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
Ping Zhang, 2006. "A Complete Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Uniform Price IPO Auctions," Discussion Papers 2006-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2006. "An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 602-629, June. [Downloadable!]

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