Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.
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Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number
01ej.
Length: 20 pages Date of creation: 27 Jan 2001 Date of revision:
27 Jan 2001 Publication status: Published in Electricity Journal, 70-79, July 2001 Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01ej
Contact details of provider: Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211 Phone: (202) 318-0520 Fax: (202) 318-0520 Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Natalia Fabra & Nils-Henrik von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2002.
"Designing Electricity Auctions,"
Microeconomics
0211017, EconWPA, revised 31 Aug 2003.
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