The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 07c700mhz.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Publication status: Published in Submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 13 November 2007
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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- Peter Cramton, 2009.
"Innovation and Market Design,"
Innovation Policy and the Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 113 - 137.
- Gregory Rosston & Michael Topper, 2009. "An Antitrust Analysis of the Case for Wireless Network Neutrality," Discussion Papers 08-040, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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