Auctions: Theory and Practice
AbstractThis book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics. It can be used for a graduate course on auction theory, or – by picking selectively – an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. Part A introduces the basic theory. Part B shows how modern auction-theoretic tools illuminate a range of mainstream economic questions that are superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices. The material was presented as the inaugural (2003) Toulouse Lectures in Economics and is forthcoming at Princeton University Press. This document contains the Contents, Preface and Introduction to the book. A draft of the FULL BOOK is available at http://www.paulklemperer.org.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2004-W09.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 23 Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Auctions; Bidding; Auction Theory; Mechanism Design; Telecommunications; Spectrum Auctions; 3G; UMTS;
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-03-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2004-04-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2004-03-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-RMG-2004-03-28 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"What Really Matters in Auction Design,"
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2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Paul Klemperer, 1997. "Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and its Applications," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Roberts, John, 1989. "The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1060-90, October.
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