In Google we trust?
AbstractIn a micro-founded model, we derive novel incentives for a monopoly search engine to distort its organic and its sponsored results on searches for online content and offline products. Distorting organic results towards content publishers with less effective display advertising and/or distorting sponsored results towards higher margin merchants (by underweighting consumer relevance in search auctions) increase per capita revenues but lower participation. The interplay of these incentives determines search bias and welfare. We also characterize how the welfare consequences of integration into display advertising, as intermediary or publisher, depend on asymmetries, monopolization and targeting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 935.13.
Date of creation: 27 Sep 2013
Date of revision: 12 Feb 2014
Search engine bias; internet economics; vertical integration; two-sided markets; antitrust;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yongmin Chen & Chuan He, 2011.
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Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(556), pages F309-F328, November.
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- Argenton, C. & Prüfer, J., 2012.
"Search engine competition with network externalities,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5117898, Tilburg University.
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- Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison, 2007.
"Position Auctions with Consumer Search,"
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- Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2009. "What do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 680-704, 04.
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