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A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types

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  • Tilman Börgers
  • Peter Norman

Abstract

We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000171.

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Date of creation: 29 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000171

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  1. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  2. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & CREMER, Jacques & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1690, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
  4. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  5. Neeman, Z., 1998. "The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics 93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  6. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1511, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  8. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Eso, Peter & Futo, Gabor, 1999. "Auction design with a risk averse seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 71-74, October.
  10. Andreas Pape & Subir Bose & Emre Ozdenoren, 2004. "Optimal auctions with ambiguity," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 609, Econometric Society.
  11. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Robustly collusion-proof implementation," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0506-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  12. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
  14. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  15. Cremer, Jacques, & Riordan, Michael H, 1985. "A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 77-84, January.
  16. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
  17. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
  18. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
  2. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2013. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 437, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Ludwig Ensthaler & Thomas Giebe, 2010. "How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1517, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
  5. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 53, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 21 Aug 2012.
  6. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  7. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
  8. Bierbrauer, Felix J., 2011. "Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 553-569.
  9. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," 2008 Meeting Papers 1097, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 503-512, March.
  11. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.
  12. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.

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