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Overcoming Participation Constraints Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Hanming Fang (Cowles Foundation, Yale University )
Peter Norman (University of British Columbia)
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In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are generally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but possibly unrelated social decisions, a slightly perturbed Groves mechanism can implement an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, while respecting all participation, incentive and balanced budget constraints.
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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number
1511.
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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1511Contact details of provider: Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA Phone: (203) 432-3702 Fax: (203) 432-6167 Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Glena Ames).
Keywords: Linking ; Participation constraints ; Perturbed groves mechanism ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2005.
"Overcoming Participation Constraints ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
norman-05-04-22-05-35-30, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 28 Apr 2005.
[Downloadable!] Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2005.
"Overcoming Participation Constraints ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1511R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2004.
"An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Feb 2005.
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Carl Bergstrom & Ted Bergstrom, 2004.
"The costs and benefits of library site licenses to academic journals ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
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Peter Norman, 2004.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188, October.
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Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988.
"Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions ,"
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Econometrica ,
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Discussion Papers
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Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007.
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Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990.
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Casella, Alessandra, 2002.
"Storable Votes ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions:
Alessandra Casella, 2002.
"Storable Votes ,"
NBER Working Papers
9189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alessandra Casella, 2002.
"Storable votes ,"
Discussion Papers
0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Casella, Alessandra, 2005.
"Storable votes ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979.
"Incentives and incomplete information ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
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Townsend, Robert M, 1982.
"Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-86, December.
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Copeland, B.R. & Taylor, M.S., 1993.
"Trade and Transboundary Pollution ,"
UBC Departmental Archives
93-46, UBC Department of Economics.
Other versions: Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007.
"Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1 ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1997.
"Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency ,"
Working Paper Series
199, MIT Center for Coordination Science.
[Downloadable!]
repec:att:wimass:1920015 is not listed on IDEAS
Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988.
"On the mechanics of economic development ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006.
"Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[Downloadable!]
Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2009.
"A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 477-489, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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