A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
AbstractWe uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Mechanism design; Exact and approximate implementation; Iteratively undominated strategies; Restricted deception-proofness; Incentive compatibility; Measurability;
Other versions of this item:
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies," Working Papers 2010-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Working Papers 2010-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007.
"Robust Virtual Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1609RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007.
"Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine,"
2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
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