When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?
AbstractExisting proofs of Condorcet's Jury Theorem formulate only sufficient conditions for its validity. This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for Condorcet's Jury Theorem. The framework of the analysis is the case of heterogeneous decisional competence, but the independence assumption is maintained.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 23 January 1997/Accepted: 8 March 1997
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