To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question
This paper deals with electing candidates. In elections voters are frequently offered a small set of actions (voting in favor of one candidate, voting blank, spoiling the ballot, and not showing up). Thus voters can express neither a negative opinion nor an opinion on more than one candidate. Approval voting partially fills this gap by asking an opinion on all candidates. Still the choice is only between approval and non approval. However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of suffcient knowledge for approving the candidate. In this paper we characterize the dis&approval voting rule, a natural extension of approval voting that distinguishes between indifference and disapproval.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ehu.es/fundamentosI/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francisco Arcelus & Gary Mauser & Z. Spindler, 1978. "The right to vote no: revising the voting system and resuscitating the F-Y voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 67-83, December.
- Hillinger, Claude, 2005.
"The Case for Utilitarian Voting,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
653, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003.
"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:9052. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alcira Macías Redondo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.