Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments
AbstractThe paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 353.
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
approval voting; cardinal utility; instant runoff voting; plurality voting; voting paradoxes;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-06-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2004-06-02 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2004-06-02 (Positive Political Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Alcantud, José Carlos R. & Laruelle, Annick, 2012.
"To approve or not to approve: this is not the only question,"
41885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laruelle, Annick & Rodríguez Alcantud, José Carlos, . "To appove or not to approve: this is not the only question," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-63, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013.
"Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election,"
Working Papers of BETA
2013-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier & Isabelle Lebon, 2013. "Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election," Working Papers hal-00803024, HAL.
- Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2009. "Threshold aggregation of multi-graded rankings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 58-63, July.
- Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
- José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.