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A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda Compromise

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  • William Gehrlein
  • Florenz Plassmann

Abstract

The Borda Compromise states that, if one has to choose among five popular voting rules that are not Condorcet consistent, one should always give preference to the Borda rule over the four other rules. We assess the theoretical as well as the empirical support for the Borda Compromise. We find that, despite considerable differences between the properties of the theoretical framework and the characteristics of two sets of observed ranking data, all three analyses provide considerable support for the Borda Compromise. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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  • William Gehrlein & Florenz Plassmann, 2014. "A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda Compromise," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 747-772, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:3:p:747-772
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0798-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521004046.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal, 2012. "Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover (ed.), Electoral Systems, chapter 0, pages 19-91, Springer.
    3. Fishburn, Peter C., 1974. "Paradoxes of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 537-546, June.
    4. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.
    5. T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2012. "Modeling the Outcomes of Vote-Casting in Actual Elections," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover (ed.), Electoral Systems, chapter 0, pages 217-251, Springer.
    6. William Gehrlein, 2011. "Strong measures of group coherence and the probability that a pairwise majority rule winner exists," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 365-374, February.
    7. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2012. "The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover (ed.), Electoral Systems, chapter 0, pages 173-199, Springer.
    8. Saari,Donald G., 2001. "Decisions and Elections," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808163.
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    Cited by:

    1. William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou, 2015. "Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 2345-2368, November.
    2. Stefania Capecchi & Domenico Piccolo, 2017. "Dealing with heterogeneity in ordinal responses," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(5), pages 2375-2393, September.
    3. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2018. "An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 53-79, June.
    4. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2016. "Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 941-966, September.
    5. Dominique Lepelley & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2018. "Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 1-33, January.
    6. Haikady N Nagaraja & Shane Sanders, 2020. "The aggregation paradox for statistical rankings and nonparametric tests," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-21, March.

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