Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'
AbstractIn a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-18.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
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social choice; impossibility theorems; metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion;
Other versions of this item:
- Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 25-28, June.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1989. "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 187-90, February.
- Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-06, September.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, April.
- Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009.
"Collective Preference and Choice,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897259, April.
- Donald Saari & Anne Petron, 2006. "Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 265-281, 06.
- Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
- Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, April.
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