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Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’

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  • Shmuel Nitzan

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Abstract

In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-009-0424-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 25-28

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:25-28

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  1. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, April.
  2. Donald Saari & Anne Petron, 2006. "Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 265-281, 06.
  3. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1982. "Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 337-52, May.
  4. Nitzan,Shmuel, 2009. "Collective Preference and Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521722131, April.
  5. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, April.
  6. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-06, September.
  7. Lerer, Ehud & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1985. "Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 191-201, October.
  8. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1989. "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 187-90, February.
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