In a democracy, Bayrou would have won. Application of the Borda Fixed Point method to the 2007 French presidential elections
AbstractDemocratic nations are advised to have parliaments select the chief executive by the Borda Fixed Point method. The current practice of having direct popular elections using systems that have originated in history is inoptimal and actually quite undemocratic since winners are selected who don’t reflect the national sentiment. The paper gives the example of the 2007 French presidential elections. Under the currently and historically grown system of run-off plurality Sarkozy got elected while the more democratic method of Borda Fixed Point would have generated Bayrou. The example uses reasonable assumptions on underlying micro preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3170.
Date of creation: 10 May 2007
Date of revision:
voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; run-off plurality; Borda Fixed Point; democracy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2007-05-19 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-19 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477, July.
- Colignatus, Thomas, 2010. "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands," MPRA Paper 22671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Jul 2007.
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