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Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights

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Author Info
Colignatus, Thomas

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Abstract

Various scientists under the label of “Scientists for a democratic Europe” (SDE) sent a joint “Letter to the governments of the EU member states” (2007) advising the use of the Penrose Square Root Weights (PSRW) for the EU Council of Ministers. When we compare the SDE letter with Colignatus (2001, 2007b) “Voting theory for democracy” (VTFD) then we find that SDE does not fit voting theory for democracy. Inspection of the material upon which the SDE letter is based also shows a moral choice while the rigorous empirical analysis by Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2007) is actually misrepresented. So the SDE letter can also be rejected on its own grounds. The PSRW approach seems not valid for (indivisible) individuals but may be applicable for divisible shares in shareholder meetings.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3885/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3885.

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Date of creation: 06 Jul 2007
Date of revision: 06 Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3885

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Related research
Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Penrose square root weights;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
H0 - Public Economics - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

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