The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 144 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Condorcet cycle; Strategic voting; Referendum; Swiss cantons;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001.
"An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate,"
Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. " An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-45, April.
- Adrian Van Deemen, 1999. "The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 171-182.
- Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350.
- Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
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