An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate
AbstractSocial choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 107 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Empirical social choice - special issue of "Public Choice"
by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard on 2014-02-17 09:15:00
- Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2011. "Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections," MPRA Paper 35302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
- Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Majority judgment in an election with Borda majority count," MPRA Paper 50846, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2011.
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014.
"Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975,"
Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 483-497, March.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2013. "Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975," MPRA Paper 49682, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages.
- Luigi Mittone, 2003. "The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process," CEEL Working Papers 0306, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
- Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2012. "Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 407-413, September.
- Malthe Munkøe, 2014. "Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 383-397, March.
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