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A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology

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  • Claudio Bonilla

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Abstract

This study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition. I develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment. Three important results arise for thehomogeneous-polity case. First, the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election. Second,a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party. Third,political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-004-6157-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 121 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 51-67

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:51-67

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. V. Medvedev, 1992. "Economic Theory," Problems of Economic Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 35(7), pages 55-73, November.
  2. Crain, William Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1976. "Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 177-88, April.
  3. Denzau, Arthur T & Parks, Robert P, 1975. "The Continuity of Majority Rule Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(5-6), pages 853-66, Sept.-Nov.
  4. Enelow, James M & Munger, Michael C, 1993. " The Elements of Candidate Reputation: The Effect of Record and Credibility on Optimal Spatial Location," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 757-72, December.
  5. Enelow, James M & Hinich, Melvin J, 1994. " A Test of the Predictive Dimensions Model in Spatial Voting Theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 155-69, February.
  6. Austen-Smith, David, 1994. "Strategic Transmission of Costly Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 955-63, July.
  7. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
  8. Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
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