The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process
AbstractThis paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of the voting process. The experiment is build on a game played through computers and the experimental subjects must perform some choices that can led to different individual and collective solutions. The game that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session of the experiment will be run. The idea is to verify the degree of stability of the collective choices (logrolling phenomena)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0306.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001.
"An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate,"
Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2001. " An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 135-45, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco Tecilla).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.