Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States
AbstractThe purpose of this article is to shed light on the relation between large and small member states with regard to the majority principle. Since Maastricht at the latest the institutional discussion centers around the question of how to devise a decision system which pays equal attention to the interests of small and large states in the European Union. This article challenges several underlying assumptions: that size is an important factor determining the political clout of a member state; the existence of ‘natural’ interest divergences and the competitive nature of the European politiy. Finally, it questions the intrinsic relation between majority voting and democracy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages in its series The Constitutionalism Web-Papers with number p0019.
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2004
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/esml/
democracy; majority voting; European Convention; legitimacy; political science;
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- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
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