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An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate

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  • Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Abstract

Social choice theory suggests that the occurrence of cyclical collective preferences should be a widespread phenomenon, especially in large groups of decision-makers. However, empirical research has so far failed to produce evidence of the existence of many real-world examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence of a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime minister, using pair-wise comparisons. This result is compared with those of a similar poll, but by using different voting methods, each resulting in different choices. The example demonstrates the empirical reality of cyclical collective preferences and the importance of the choice of institutions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1010304729545
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 107 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 135-145

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:107:y:2001:i:1:p:135-145

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. " Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-90, December.
  2. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1976. "The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 14-25, August.
  3. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-54, March.
  4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Empirical social choice - special issue of "Public Choice"
    by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard in Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard on 2014-02-17 09:15:00
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Cited by:
  1. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Majority judgment in an election with Borda majority count," MPRA Paper 50846, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2011.
  2. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2012. "Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 407-413, September.
  3. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
  4. Richard Potthoff, 2013. "Simple manipulation-resistant voting systems designed to elect Condorcet candidates and suitable for large-scale public elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 101-122, January.
  5. Malthe Munkøe, 2014. "Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 383-397, March.
  6. Luigi Mittone, 2003. "The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process," CEEL Working Papers 0306, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  7. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
  8. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 483-497, March.
  9. Johannes Pollak, 2004. "Democracy and the European Constitution: Majority Voting and Small Member States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0019, University of Bath, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages.
  10. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2011. "Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections," MPRA Paper 35302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
  12. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2013. "Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975," MPRA Paper 49682, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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