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Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections

Author

Listed:
  • Salvatore Barbaro

    (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz)

  • Nils D. Steiner

    (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz)

Abstract

Out of the many possible voting schemes, the notoriously-used plurality rule is far from being the best. Previous research from France and the US reveals how plurality winners fall short of majority support. Therefore, eminent scholars advocate the simple-majority rule. The latter, however, faces the threat of indeterminacy due to cycling patterns. To contribute to the scarce evidence on the empirical occurrence of these phenomena, we used survey data from the 2017 German election to simulate preference orderings on district candidates. We find that violations of the majority principle are frequent. Conversely, we do not uncover any indeterminacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2022. "Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections," Working Papers 2202, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    • Handle: RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Plurality voting; simple-majority rule; indeterminacy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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