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Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

Author

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  • Andreas Kleiner
  • Benny Moldovanu

Abstract

We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a "left-right" axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empirical implications for two case studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2022. "Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 583-615, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:583-615
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200147
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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Barbaro & Nils D. Steiner, 2022. "Majority principle and indeterminacy in German elections," Working Papers 2202, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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