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The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

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Author Info
Aki Lehtinen ()
Abstract

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9028-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 1-40
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:1:p:1-40

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: agendas; counterbalancing; simulation; strategic voting; welfare; D71; D81;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chen, Kong-Pin & Yang, Sheng-Zhang, 2002. " Strategic Voting in Open Primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 1-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
  9. Ilia Tsetlin & Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 2003. "The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 387-398, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sloth Birgitte, 1993. "The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 152-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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