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The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

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  • Lehtinen, Aki
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    Abstract

    This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Under approval voting utilitarian efficiency is relatively high irrespective of the behavioural assumption, and under the plurality rule strategic voting significantly increases utilitarian efficiency.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-4S2MHT0-1/2/3beaaca97be08287286e8cd022563ce3
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 24 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 688-704

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:3:p:688-704

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    References

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    1. Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
    2. David P. Myatt & Stephen D. Fisher, 2002. "Tactical Coordination in Plurality Electoral Systems," Economics Series Working Papers 133, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    4. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.
    5. Lehtinen, Aki, 2006. "Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(9), pages 2495-2507, May.
    6. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August.
    7. David P. Myatt, 2007. "On the Theory of Strategic Voting -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 255-281.
    8. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    9. David P. Myatt, 2002. "Idiosyncrasy, Information and the Impact of Strategic Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 94, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    10. Miguel Angel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 675.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    11. Donald G. Saari, 2001. "Analyzing a nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 415-430.
    12. Samuel Merrill, 1981. "Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 115-134, January.
    13. David P. Myatt & Stephen D. Fisher, 2002. "Everything is Uncertain and Uncertainty is Everything: Strategic Voting in Simple Plurality Elections," Economics Series Working Papers 115, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October.
    15. Carter, Cyril, 1990. " Admissible and Sincere Strategies under Approval Voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 43-55, January.
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    Cited by:
    1. Eckert, Daniel & Klamler, Christian, 2010. "An equity-efficiency trade-off in a geometric approach to committee selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 386-391, September.

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