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Strategic Voting and the Degree of Path-Dependence

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  • Aki Lehtinen

    (University of Helsinki)

Abstract

This paper generalises Enelow (J Polit 43(4):1062–1089, 1981) and Lehtinen’s (Theory Decis 63(1):1–40, 2007b) model of strategic voting under amendment agendas by allowing any number of alternatives and any voting order. The generalisation enables studying utilitarian efficiencies in an incomplete information model with a large number of alternatives. Furthermore, it allows for studying how strategic voting affects path-dependence. Strategic voting increases utilitarian efficiency also when there are more than three alternatives. The existence of a Condorcet winner does not guarantee path-independence if the voters engage in strategic voting under incomplete information. A criterion for evaluating path-dependence, the degree of path-dependence, is proposed, and the generalised model is used to study how strategic voting affects it. When there is a Condorcet winner, strategic voting inevitably increases the degree of path-dependence, but when there is no Condorcet winner, strategic voting decreases path-dependence. Computer simulations show, however, that on average it increases the degree of path-dependence.

Suggested Citation

  • Aki Lehtinen, 2015. "Strategic Voting and the Degree of Path-Dependence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 97-114, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9381-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-014-9381-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937.
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    6. Lehtinen, Aki, 2006. "Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(9), pages 2495-2507, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hämäläinen, Raimo P. & Lahtinen, Tuomas J., 2016. "Path dependence in Operational Research—How the modeling process can influence the results," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 3(C), pages 14-20.
    2. Pivato, Marcus, 2015. "Condorcet meets Bentham," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 58-65.

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