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Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information

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Author Info
Camille Cornand (Financial Market Group, London School of Economics and Political Sciences Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United-Kingdom, C.Cornand@lse.ac.uk)
Frank Heinemann (Technische Universität Berlin, Sekretariat H 52 Strasse des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin f.heinemann@ww.tu-berlin.de)

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Abstract

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players’ private value. The main result is to show that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed (ii) private beliefs about the relative precision of these signals sufficiently differ. We derive economic policy implications of such a result.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 157.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:157

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Related research
Keywords: Speculative attack; Private value game; Multiple equilibria; Public and private information;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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  4. Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann, 2001. "Competition for Order Flow as a Coordination Game," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 64, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  5. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jean-Marc Tallon, 2006. "Incertitude stratégique et sélection d'équilibre : deux applications," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177058_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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