Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting
AbstractWe discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter- natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this op- timal behaviour coincides with an intuitive and common definition of sincerity. For voting mechanisms allowing for multiple message types, such as approval vot- ing (AV), there exists no conclusive definition of sincerity in the literature. We show that for AV, voters' optimal strategy tends to one of the existent definitions of sincerity, consisting in voting for those alternatives that yield more than the average of cardinal utilities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 675.07.
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
sincere and strategic voting; approval voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-01-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2007-01-28 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2007-01-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005.
"Making Statements and Approval Voting,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1531, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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Virginia Economics Online Papers
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- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2007.
"Size Approval Voting,"
Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra
0703, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
- Lehtinen, Aki, 2008. "The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 688-704, September.
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