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The occurrence of the paradox of voting in University elections

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  • Richard Niemi

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  • Richard Niemi, 1970. "The occurrence of the paradox of voting in University elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 91-100, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:8:y:1970:i:1:p:91-100
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718507
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riker, William H., 1958. "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 349-366, June.
    2. Michael Taylor, 1968. "Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 35-47, March.
    3. Niemi, Richard G., 1969. "Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 488-497, June.
    4. Leon Gleser, 1969. "The paradox of voting: Some probabilistic results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 47-63, September.
    5. Riker, William H., 1961. "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 900-911, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    2. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001. "An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 135-145, April.
    3. Dean Jamison, 1975. "The probability of intransitive majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 87-94, September.
    4. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    6. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1986. "Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 71-80, January.
    7. Marek M. Kaminski, 2015. "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 20, pages 367-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Michel Regenwetter & James Adams & Bernard Grofman, 2002. "On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 153-186, September.

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