Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Mutual knowledge structures and social coordination: a knowledge-induced equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Richards, Diana
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Shared knowledge structures, such as cognitive categories and relationships, are central to the interpretation of a complex social environment and thus play an important role in mediating between individual preferences and group outcomes. This article defines a "knowledge-induced equilibrium" that applies to both cooperative game theory, such as social choice and voting, and to non-cooperative game theory, such as coordination games. This equilibrium concept bridges between interpretive approaches, which emphasize cognitive structures or frames, and positive approaches, which focus on preferences, choice, and the stability of collective outcomes.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7478
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center in its series Bulletins with number 7478.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ags:umedbu:7478

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 231ClaOff Building, 1994 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108-6040
    Phone: (612) 625-1222
    Fax: (612) 625-6245
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.apec.umn.edu/EDC.html
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Political Economy;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October.
    2. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History, EconWPA 9309003, EconWPA.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    5. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    7. Wendt, Alexander, 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(02), pages 391-425, March.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    9. Michael Taylor, 1968. "Graph-theoretic approaches to the theory of social choice," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 35-47, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:umedbu:7478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.