Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox
AbstractWe establish a new suffcient condition for avoiding a generalization of the Anscombe’s paradox. In a situation where ballots describe positions regarding ﬁnitely many yes-or-no issues, the Anscombe’s alpha−paradox holds if more than alpha % of the voters disagree with on a majority of issues with the outcome of issue-wise majority voting. We deﬁne the level of unanimity of a set of ballots as the number of issues minus the maximal symmetric diatance between two ballots. We compute for the caseof large electorates, the exact level of unanimity above which the Anscombe’s alpha−paradox never holds, whatever the distribution of votes among ballots.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University in its series Working Papers with number 201301.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Anscombe; Voting Paradox; Majority Rule; Unamity Issue-wise voting;
Other versions of this item:
- G. Laffond & J. Lainé, 2013. "Unanimity and the Anscombe’s paradox," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 590-611, October.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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