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Governance and the dimensions of autocracy

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  • Ryan H. Murphy

    (Southern Methodist University)

Abstract

Recent work at the frontiers of classical liberal political economy has reconsidered the idea that certain autocratic political institutions may improve on the consensus liberal, constitutional democratic political institutions. This paper will discuss conceptually how these new arguments, predatory forms of autocracy, the status quo of constitutional democracy, and the proponents of more majoritarian forms of democratic governance should be understood in terms of one another. It will then perform a simple empirical examination of the modern world, looking at the quality of governance by country by the quality of its democracy, conditional on a country’s economic output, education, and culture. Examples of autocracy with good governance, even when conditioning on these other variables, are sufficiently rare to raise serious questions for the new classical liberal proponents of autocracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "Governance and the dimensions of autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 131-148, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:30:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-018-9270-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9270-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Óscar Gutiérrez & Marco Martínez-Esteller, 2022. "Tax collection in the Roman Empire: a new institutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 378-401, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Autocracy; Governance; Executive constraint;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

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