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Inefficient private renegotiation of sovereign debt Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kletzer, Kenneth M.
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The negotiation of sovereign debt repayments and of new loans after default may yield inefficient outcomes that justify intervention by creditor country governments and international financial institutions. The author analyzes possible distortions arising in renegotiations between private creditors and sovereign borrowers. He argues that legal privileges accorded to existing creditors in their home jurisdictions can distort the flow of resources for capital formation abroad. Seniority privileges for old lenders convey to them some of the social returns from new lending, reducing the potential rewards for those who might provide the new funds. Hence the author urges investigation of official alienation of these privileges, regulatory reform, and introduction of alternative financial instruments that embody opportunities for creditor commitment.
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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number
441.
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Date of creation: 31 Oct 1990Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:441Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433 Email: Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
Keywords: Strategic Debt Management ; Economic Theory&Research ; Environmental Economics&Policies ; Banks&Banking Reform ; Financial Intermediation ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
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Other versions: Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
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Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984.
"Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk ,"
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Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1989.
" LDC Debt: Forgiveness, Indexation, and Investment Incentives ,"
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter ,"
International Finance
0003004, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Kletzer, Kenneth Miles, Jr. & Wright, Brian D., 1995.
"Sovereign debt as intertemporal barter ,"
CUDARE Working Paper Series
761, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter ,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
Kenneth Kletzer & Brian Wright, 1998.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter ,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series
1024, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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