Sovereign Debt Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale - Economic Growth Center in its series Papers with number 555.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
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debt ; risk ; income ; economic equilibrium ; information ; negociations;
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- Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1990.
"Inefficient private renegotiation of sovereign debt,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
441, The World Bank.
- Kletzer, Kenneth, 1989. "Inefficient Private Renegotiation of Sovereign Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Newbery, David M. & Wright, Brian D., 1990. "Alternative instruments for smoothing the consumption of primary commodity exporters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 558, The World Bank.
- Luisa Lambertini, 2001. "Volatility and Sovereign Default," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 577, Boston College Department of Economics.
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