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Sovereign Theft: Theory And Evidence About Sovereign Default And Expropriation

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  • Michael Tomz

    ()

  • Mark L. J. Wright

    ()

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between default on sovereign borrowing and the expropriation of foreign direct investment in both theory and in practice.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CAMA Working Papers with number 2008-07.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2008-07

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References

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  1. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2007. "Do Countries Default in "Bad Times" ?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 352-360, 04-05.
  3. Broner, Fernando A & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2007. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2004. "Defaultable debt, interest rates, and the current account," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 04-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  5. Harold L. Cole & James Dow & William B. English, 1994. "Default, settlement, and signalling: lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 180, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. David Benjamin & Mark L. J. Wright, 2009. "Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory Of Delays In Sovereign Debt Renegotiations," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University 2009-15, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  7. Cole, Harold L. & English, William B., 1991. "Expropriation and direct investment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 201-227, May.
  8. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luca Di Corato, 2010. "Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2010.5, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University 2013-16, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  3. Harms, Philipp & an de Meulen, Philipp, 2013. "Demographic structure and the security of property rights: The role of development and democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 73-89.
  4. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-98, September.
  5. Chris Hajzler, 2010. "Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments: Sectoral Patterns from 1993 to 2006," Working Papers, University of Otago, Department of Economics 1011, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2010.
  6. Miguel Fuentes & Diego Saravia, 2006. "Sovereign Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?," Documentos de Trabajo, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 314, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  7. Eden, Maya & Kraay, Aart & Qian, Rong, 2012. "Sovereign defaults and expropriations : empirical regularities," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 6218, The World Bank.
  8. Hajzler, Christopher, 2014. "Resource-based FDI and expropriation in developing economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 124-146.

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