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Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default

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  • Michael Tomz

    (Department of Political Science, Stanford Center for International Development, and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305)

  • Mark L.J. Wright

    ()
    (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095
    National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Abstract

In this article, we review the empirical literature about sovereign debt and default. As we survey the work of economists, historians, and political scientists, we also emphasize parallel developments by theorists and recommend steps to improve the correspondence between theory and data.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Annual Reviews in its journal Annual Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 247-272

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Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:5:y:2013:p:247-272

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Keywords: capital flows; international macroeconomics; international relations; political economy;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4333, CESifo Group Munich.

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